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Others had earlier noted that despite the dropping of millions of leaflets over targeted Japanese cities to warn civilians to flee their cities, given additional scheduled B-29 fire raids, few had heeded the admonishments.
Either the Japanese people believed that their industries dispersed within civilian neighborhoods were so integral to the survival of Japan that they could not be abandoned, or they did not think the Americans would continue with the raids, or they assumed that their own government would use lethal force to prevent massive flights, or their sense of patriotism and confidence in ultimate victory prevented any mass withdrawals from soon-to-be-targeted cities.
As a result, the commission concluded that only a surprise attack without warning on a military/industrial/urban target would be the best way to maximize the bomb’s ability to shock the Japanese government into surrendering.
Note that even after the second bomb dropped on Nagasaki, there was an attempted coup by senior Japanese military officers aimed at preventing peace discussions. And there were many in the Japanese hierarchy, even after the second bomb, who believed the atomic bombs were too expensive, or too few, or too untested to be used in any further number. Instead, the dead-enders believed that an Okinawa-like resistance on a nationwide scale could still kill so many Allied soldiers that London and Washington would call off the effort to invade and occupy their nation.
*2) But why did the Americans need to drop any bombs?*
Since March 1945, the B-29s had destroyed perhaps somewhere over 75 percent of the industrial capacity and the urban cores of the majority of the Japanese cities. Yet the military government had shown no sign of surrendering. American submarines and B-29 mining of the harbors had already eliminated almost all maritime traffic in and out of Japanese ports. And still the Japanese resisted.
The months-long firebombing of Japan had cost well over 400 of the massive B-29 bombers (each plane with a crew of 11 and costing $1 million). The recent bloodbath at Okinawa was the deadliest American battle of the entire Pacific War. The fighting was not declared over until just six weeks before Hiroshima, and even then, there still remained pockets of stiff Japanese resistance.
Okinawa had cost over 50,000 American casualties, including 12,000 dead. Over 750 planes were lost and some 380 ships damaged—mostly by attacks by 850 kamikazes. The last twelve months before Hiroshima had killed more Americans than during any other year of the war.
In hindsight, we may think the atomic bombs were superfluous or gratuitous. But the generation that fought the war was despairing that the fighting had become bloodier and more horrific the longer it went on, the closer the allies got to Japan, and the harder it became to impose an unconditional surrender. After Okinawa, they saw no end to the killing in sight, but only more, and far greater, Okinawas on the horizon.
By calculating the number of Japanese troops who fought at Okinawa and the resulting American losses (and also computing the earlier bloody conquest of the Philippines as well), the American military correctly judged that it likely would lose well over one million casualties in the two-pronged invasions of Japan planned for 1945–1946.
Japan could have fielded at least 3.5 million troops and between 5,000and 6,000 kamikazes—one-way fighter-bomber planes analogous to human-guided cruise missiles, far more accurate and deadly than German V-1 buzz bombs.
In sum, the Allies believed that neither the devastating firebombing nor the catastrophic Japanese defeats in the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa had broken the will of the Japanese military government. Thus, Truman was desperately seeking some new solution to avoid invasions that would have likely killed millions on both sides. By earlier agreements, the Americans first had to gain the permission of the British to use the atomic bomb, which was not hard, given the savagery that the British had also experienced from the Japanese at Singapore and in Malaysia and Burma.
The two bombs together killed roughly 100,000 to 150,000 people in the first few days after the blast, with thousands more dying later from the aftereffects.
Yet there was never an American eagerness to use its exclusive control of bombs and heavy bombers.
For the next four years, the Americans enjoyed a complete monopoly on atomic bombs from August 1945 to August 1949, when the Russians, through espionage, were finally able to conduct a successful atomic bomb test. Yet, in the period of escalating Soviet-American tensions, which saw ongoing communist revolutions in China, Asia, and Africa, the U.S. did not use its one-sided advantage.
During the Korean War, the U.S. had an arsenal of over 300 atomic bombs with a huge bomber force, versus just a few newly acquired bombs on the Soviet side. Yet Presidents Truman and Eisenhower stifled talk of using nuclear threats to pressure the Russians and Chinese to stop fueling North Korean aggression.
[image: https://assets.zerohedge.com/s3fs-public/inline-images/2025-08-11_13-52-11.jpg?itok=u7pe9BIb]
Others had earlier noted that despite the dropping of millions of leaflets over targeted Japanese cities to warn civilians to flee their cities, given additional scheduled B-29 fire raids, few had heeded the admonishments.
Either the Japanese people believed that their industries dispersed within civilian neighborhoods were so integral to the survival of Japan that they could not be abandoned, or they did not think the Americans would continue with the raids, or they assumed that their own government would use lethal force to prevent massive flights, or their sense of patriotism and confidence in ultimate victory prevented any mass withdrawals from soon-to-be-targeted cities.
As a result, the commission concluded that only a surprise attack without warning on a military/industrial/urban target would be the best way to maximize the bomb’s ability to shock the Japanese government into surrendering.
Note that even after the second bomb dropped on Nagasaki, there was an attempted coup by senior Japanese military officers aimed at preventing peace discussions. And there were many in the Japanese hierarchy, even after the second bomb, who believed the atomic bombs were too expensive, or too few, or too untested to be used in any further number. Instead, the dead-enders believed that an Okinawa-like resistance on a nationwide scale could still kill so many Allied soldiers that London and Washington would call off the effort to invade and occupy their nation.
*2) But why did the Americans need to drop any bombs?*
Since March 1945, the B-29s had destroyed perhaps somewhere over 75 percent of the industrial capacity and the urban cores of the majority of the Japanese cities. Yet the military government had shown no sign of surrendering. American submarines and B-29 mining of the harbors had already eliminated almost all maritime traffic in and out of Japanese ports. And still the Japanese resisted.
The months-long firebombing of Japan had cost well over 400 of the massive B-29 bombers (each plane with a crew of 11 and costing $1 million). The recent bloodbath at Okinawa was the deadliest American battle of the entire Pacific War. The fighting was not declared over until just six weeks before Hiroshima, and even then, there still remained pockets of stiff Japanese resistance.
Okinawa had cost over 50,000 American casualties, including 12,000 dead. Over 750 planes were lost and some 380 ships damaged—mostly by attacks by 850 kamikazes. The last twelve months before Hiroshima had killed more Americans than during any other year of the war.
In hindsight, we may think the atomic bombs were superfluous or gratuitous. But the generation that fought the war was despairing that the fighting had become bloodier and more horrific the longer it went on, the closer the allies got to Japan, and the harder it became to impose an unconditional surrender. After Okinawa, they saw no end to the killing in sight, but only more, and far greater, Okinawas on the horizon.
By calculating the number of Japanese troops who fought at Okinawa and the resulting American losses (and also computing the earlier bloody conquest of the Philippines as well), the American military correctly judged that it likely would lose well over one million casualties in the two-pronged invasions of Japan planned for 1945–1946.
Japan could have fielded at least 3.5 million troops and between 5,000and 6,000 kamikazes—one-way fighter-bomber planes analogous to human-guided cruise missiles, far more accurate and deadly than German V-1 buzz bombs.
In sum, the Allies believed that neither the devastating firebombing nor the catastrophic Japanese defeats in the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa had broken the will of the Japanese military government. Thus, Truman was desperately seeking some new solution to avoid invasions that would have likely killed millions on both sides. By earlier agreements, the Americans first had to gain the permission of the British to use the atomic bomb, which was not hard, given the savagery that the British had also experienced from the Japanese at Singapore and in Malaysia and Burma.
The two bombs together killed roughly 100,000 to 150,000 people in the first few days after the blast, with thousands more dying later from the aftereffects.
Yet there was never an American eagerness to use its exclusive control of bombs and heavy bombers.
For the next four years, the Americans enjoyed a complete monopoly on atomic bombs from August 1945 to August 1949, when the Russians, through espionage, were finally able to conduct a successful atomic bomb test. Yet, in the period of escalating Soviet-American tensions, which saw ongoing communist revolutions in China, Asia, and Africa, the U.S. did not use its one-sided advantage.
During the Korean War, the U.S. had an arsenal of over 300 atomic bombs with a huge bomber force, versus just a few newly acquired bombs on the Soviet side. Yet Presidents Truman and Eisenhower stifled talk of using nuclear threats to pressure the Russians and Chinese to stop fueling North Korean aggression.
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